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ABSTRACT. We investigate the effect of IMF assistance 
on economic growth in a broad panel of countries. We 
argue that countries are likely self-select into seeking IMF 
involvement based on their economic performance. We 
control for such endogeneity by means of instrumental 
variables. Our findings indicate that the contemporaneous 
effect of the IMF involvement is insignificant while the 
lagged effect is positive. The 2SLS effect is larger than the 
OLS one, indicating that the latter is downward biased. 
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Introduction 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up in 1944 with the aim to promote 
economic and monetary stability and foster economic growth around the world. Since then, 
the IMF provided financial assistance to numerous developing and developed countries, 
including, recently, a number of peripheral European countries such as Hungary, Greece and 
Portugal. The economic effects of IMF assistance have been the subject of an on-going and 
                                                 
1 We benefited from helpful comments and suggestions from John Bennett as well as from seminar and 
conference participants at Brunel University, Bratislava Economics Meeting 2014 and Ioannina Meeting on 
Applied Economics and Finance 2014. We are grateful to Axel Dreher for making his data on the UN Security 
Council membership available to us.  
Fidrmuc, J., Kostagianni, S.  (2015), Impact of IMF Assistance on Economic 
Growth Revisited, Economics and Sociology, Vol. 8, No 3, pp. 32-40. DOI: 
10.14254/2071-789X.2015/8-3/2 
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greatly controversial debate. The findings are rather disappointing: the research available so 
far suggests that the effect on growth has been insignificant and may even have been negative.  
In theory, the IMF intervention should improve economic growth both directly and 
indirectly, for a number of reasons. First, the IMF gives policy advice at the times of crises. 
Following that advice should help improve the economic climate and thus foster growth in the 
future. Second, IMF loans frequently have strict conditions attached to them, such as 
changing the execution of monetary policy or implementing fiscal austerity. The disbursement 
of IMF loans only takes place if the recipient country adheres to the conditions. Following 
IMF’s advice and accepting the conditionality should have similar effects: improved policy 
making, if credible, is seen by consumers as indicative of a lower tax burden and higher 
growth in the future, which leads them to increase their consumption, thus fuelling growth.2 
Finally, the money that is disbursed helps relax financial constraints that the countries face 
and should stimulate their economies. In particular, as the recent EMU crisis illustrates rather 
well, in the absence of external financial assistance, crisis-stricken countries would face 
prohibitively high interest rates.  
The literature also highlights possible indirect channels: moral hazard (Vaubel, 1983) 
and the Dutch Disease (Paldam, 1997; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009). The moral hazard 
argument rests on the fact that being able to apply for assistance from the IMF (and other 
similar institutions) is similar to insurance. This can give the countries in question incentive to 
engage in risky or unsound policies. The Dutch Disease hypothesis, in turn, points out that 
countries with large inflows of foreign currency may experience a pressure on their currency 
to appreciate, which in turn undermines the competitiveness of their manufacturing firms at 
international markets. Hence, while the direct channels stipulate a positive effect of IMF 
assistance, the indirect channels are associated with a negative impact.  
An additional issue is that of endogeneity: the countries requesting assistance from the 
IMF may be already facing imminent economic difficulties at the time they submit their 
request. Alternatively, out of the countries that apply for financial aid from the IMF, those 
that receive support tend to be in worse economic situation that those that do not, or the 
former receive more substantial assistance. The negative or insignificant relationship between 
IMF assistance and economic growth therefore then can be due to such an endogeneity bias.  
Besides endogeneity, another problem with much of the past analytical literature on 
the IMF involvement and its effect is that it typically only considers how such involvement 
affects contemporaneous economic performance. If the IMF fosters growth, the positive effect 
of its assistance may appear only with a lag (Clemens et al., 2012, make a similar point about 
the effectiveness of developmental aid).  
In this paper, we revisit the effect of IMF loans while taking account of the 
aforementioned criticisms of the previous literature: endogeneity bias and the delay between 
IMF assistance and its economic effect. To account for endogeneity, we use instrumental 
variables. Finding suitable instruments, however, is difficult. In particular, the instruments 
need to possess sufficient explanatory power when it comes to explaining the probability (or 
size) of IMF assistance without being themselves correlated with growth to allow the analyst 
to exclude them from the main (second-stage) regression equation. Variables indicative of the 
economic hardship, such as the countries’ indebtedness or interest rates that they are facing 
when borrowing, are good predictors of the probability that they will seek IMF assistance. 
However, the same economic hardship is likely to be responsible for the low economic 
growth that those countries experience at the time of seeing IMF help, or that they will be 
encountering in the near future. Therefore, we rely on non-economic instrumental variables. 
                                                 
2 Giavazzi and Pagano (1990 and 1995) argue, for example, that fiscal austerity can stimulate growth in the short 
term. They argue that Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s both experienced improved growth performance 
immediately after fiscal reforms.  
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Specifically, we use the degree of democracy and the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) non-permanent membership. To account for the possibility that the effect of IFI 
assistance may not occur contemporaneously but with a delay, we allowing the IMF loans to 
have a lagged effect on growth. 
In the following section, we briefly discuss the literature on the economic effects of 
IMF assistance. We present our data and methodology in Section 3 and the results in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. IMF and Economic Growth 
 
The general finding of the existing literature is that receiving aid from the IMF and 
other international financial institutions does not stimulate economic growth of the recipient 
country. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) find that the country’s participation to the program 
has a negative effect on growth rates as long as countries remain under it. They observe also 
that as soon as they leave the program, their growth accelerates compared to the period under 
the program but they do not grow as fast as they would if they had never participated. Dreher 
(2006) argues that the reason behind the reduced growth rates of the recipient countries can be 
the self-selection into these programs. Przeworski and Vreeland seek to address this issue. 
They identify countries that face similar fiscal and monetary problems, foreign reserves crises 
or high domestic deficits, with some participating in an IMF program and others not. They 
find that those receiving IMF assistance grow by 2.35% less than the ones that do not, despite 
displaying similar economic conditions before participation.  
Barro and Lee (2003) attempt to address the issue of endogeneity of IMF programs. 
They argue that the IMF is a “bureaucratic and political organization” so that countries which 
have more influence in it have better chances to receive a loan, and that loan is likely to be 
larger compared to countries with less influence in the organization. Therefore, to deal with 
the endogeneity of the IMF loans, they use instrumental variables that reflect the recipient 
countries’ political and economic connections (such as political proximity to the US and 
major European countries, trade links with the US and Europe), which they combine with 
economic characteristics, such as reserves, lagged growth and GDP per capita. Dreher (2006) 
follows a similar approach, combining economic and political variables. Nevertheless, both 
papers’ results again indicate a significantly negative impact of the participation in an IMF 
program on the economic growth, with or without accounting for the potential endogeneity 
bias. A potential drawback of both analyses is that their instruments include economic 
indicators which are likely to be correlated with contemporaneous economic growth, the left-
hand side variable in their second-stage regression. We discuss below how we seek to avoid 
this weakness.  
Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) examine the relationship between the temporary 
membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the participation in an IMF 
program. They conclude that there is a strong and significant relationship between UNSC 
temporary membership and participation to the programs and that the UNSC membership 
translated into fewer conditions attached to the program. This suggest that IMF loans are 
potentially motivated by political considerations: countries serving on the UNSC enjoy 
disproportionate influence and the IMF (or its major shareholders) use IMF loans to secure 
the support of UNSC members.  
A number of previous studies thus sought to account for the possible self-selection 
into IMF programs using instrumental variables. However, these generally tend to rely on 
using economic characteristics as instruments. We propose, instead, to use political and 
institutional characteristics, which are less likely to be correlated with the (observable or 
unobservable) economic performance of countries before they apply for IMF aid. As both 
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Barro and Lee (2003) and Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) observe, political 
considerations are important predictors of participation to IMF loan programs. Important, 
such considerations should be largely orthogonal to the economic need for IMF assistance.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
Our data include 213 countries and 38 years (1971 to 2009). The panel is unbalanced 
since not all observations for all countries and years are available.  The data, apart from some 
exceptions mentioned below, were obtained from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Edition of April 2012. Descriptive statistics on all variables, including the 
instruments (see below) are reported in Table 1. 
The analysis is based on estimating an augmented Solow model of growth (see 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per 
capita. We include population growth and investment (gross fixed capital formation to GDP 
ratio) as explanatory variables, alongside an IMF loan dummy, the principal explanatory 
variable. The IMF dummy is constructed so as to take the value of 1 in years during which the 
country received a loan and 0 otherwise. We consider 3 IMF programs: Stand-by 
Arrangements (SBA), Extended Fund Facility (EEF) and Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility Arrangement (PRGF). The differences lie in the length of the repayment period, 
interest rates and eligibility criteria. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the program was in 
effect for at least 5 months in a particular year. The source of this dataset is the webpage of 
Axel Dreher and his 2006 paper.  
A plausible reason why the previous literature has found a negative effect of IMF 
loans on economic growth is the endogeneity of IMF assistance: countries seek IMF help, for 
the most part, when they already face economic problems or are about to face such problems 
in the very near future. Therefore, there may be reverse causality between the dummy variable 
for IMF involvement and the growth rate. To find good instruments, however, is invariably 
difficult. The instruments have to be uncorrelated with the error term; this can be tested by 
means of the Sargan statistic: insignificant result suggest that the instruments can be excluded 
from the main regression. Furthermore, we want to ensure that the instruments are not 
correlated with the economic hardship that the countries are experiencing at the time of 
applying for IMF assistance. For example, the debt to GDP ratio or another measure of 
indebtedness would certainly likely to be a strong predictor of participation in IMF programs. 
However, this is exactly the kind of self-selection based on econ hardship that we argue may 
bias the results and which we want to eliminate.  
Therefore, we focus on instruments that reflect institutional and/or political rather than 
economic conditions. We select democracy and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
non-permanent membership (as for the latter, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009, find the 
UNSC temporary membership to be a strong predictor of countries’ participation in IMF 
programs). The UNSC non-permanent membership takes the form of a dummy coded 1 when 
the country was a member and 0 when not.3 The data on democracy are obtained from the 
PolityIV site. The variable takes values between -10 and 10, with the extreme values 
indicating autocracy and consolidated democracy, respectively.  
Finally, loans disbursed in one year may affect the economy in that year or in the 
subsequent year or years (see Clemens et al., 2012). The effect may be delayed for a number 
of reasons. Some loans may be allocated relatively late in the year and therefore cannot have 
much effect on that year’s economic outcomes. Furthermore, it may take a while for the effect 
of such loans (and/or the attached conditions) to work its way through the economy. In 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to Axel Dreher for making the data available on his webpage.  
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particular, it is possible for the loans and especially for the attached conditions to be 
associated with a J-curved effect: the immediate effect is negative, because of the austerity 
measures required, but the economy rebounds successfully, as the loans and the reforms start 
having a positive impact on growth. To explore this possibility, we include the IMF dummy 
in our regressions contemporaneously as well as lagged by up to three years.  
 
3. Results 
 
Table 2 reports the OLS results. The first column presents the results with the IMF 
variable entering the regression contemporaneously: this regression confirms the general 
result suggesting that the effect of IMF assistance on economic growth is insignificant.  The 
other two explanatory variables are significant at the 1% level, with the investment having a 
positive effect whereas that of the population growth negative. To examine how the growth 
rate behaves over time in relation to the IMF aid, we lag the IMF program dummy by between 
one and three years (columns 2-4). Doing so results in a striking change in the results: the 
dummy is significant at the 1 percent level in all three cases. Nevertheless, the effect seems 
low: participation in an IMF program increases the average annual growth by between 0.68 
and 0.82 percent. The effects of the other two explanatory variables remain unchanged.   
As we argue above, the OLS results may be biased due to endogeneity of IMF 
assistance. If this is the case, the growth rate may be falling independently of the IMF 
program participation. To remedy this, we apply the instrumental variables discussed in the 
preceding section: democracy (PolityIV score) and UNSC temporary membership. We report 
the 2SLS results in Table 3, again for the contemporaneous effect as well as with the IMF 
dummy lagged by up to three years. The first-stage F-statistic is always over 10, indicating 
that our two instruments explain the variation in IMF program participation rather well. In 
particular, as the first-stage results in the lower part of the Table show, democracy is 
positively and strongly significantly correlated with the probability of participating in an IMF 
program: democracies are significant more likely to receive IMF assistance then non-
democratic countries. Contrary to our expectations, the UNSC non-permanent membership 
turns out insignificant. A possible explanation is that the effect of democracy dominates that 
of UNSC membership. The Sargan statistic is insignificant with the exception of the 
regression with the 2nd lag of IMF aid: given that our instruments pass this hurdle in three 
cases out of four, we feel fairly confident that our instruments are valid.  
The IMF effect, when examined contemporaneously, is again insignificant. When we 
lag the IMF dummy, it always turns out positive and significant. Moreover, the magnitude of 
the effect is increased considerably compared with the OLS results, indicating that the OLS 
indeed yields downward-biased estimates. The size of the effect rises as more lags are used 
and the effect of IMF program participation appears sizeable: growth improves, on average, 
by between 4 and 7 percent per year. After correcting for the endogeneity bias and allowing 
for a lagged effect of IMF loans, we see that participation in IMF programs indeed has a 
positive, and powerful, effect on economic growth.  
As Table 1 shows, our data include observations of extremely low and high growth 
rates. These pertain mainly to countries affected by war (low growth) or recovering from a 
war (high growth). To make sure that our results are not affected by such potential outliers, 
we replicate the 2SLS analysis without observations for which the growth rate is outside the  
[-10,10] range. This leads to dropping 186 observations with growth rates below -10 percent 
and 2173 observations with growth above 10 percent. The 2SLS results, nevertheless, are 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. The main difference is slightly lower magnitude of 
the coefficients estimated for the IMF effect, ranging from 2.42 for the contemporaneous 
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effect (which is significant at the 10 percent level) to 5.21 for the 3rd lag. These results are 
available upon request.  
 
Conclusions  
 
International financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, disburse 
sizeable sums of money to countries in need. Yet, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness 
of that assistance, in terms of fostering economic growth or investment, is disappointing. As 
the recent overview studies by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2009) demonstrate, the effect 
of aid on growth is at best zero. The performance sheet of the IMF is particularly bad, with 
several studies reviewed in Section 2 of this paper concluding that countries that received 
assistance from the IMF do subsequently significantly worse than those that did not.  
In this paper, we take a second look at the impact of IMF aid on economic growth. We 
argue that the insignificant or negative results found by the other studies can be due to two 
facts: (1) the effect of IMF assistance arrives with a lag rather than immediately, and 
(2) countries self-select to request IMF assistance, so that the relationship between IMF 
involvement and economic growth is likely to be subject to endogeneity bias. That puts our 
approach (and results) in line with those of Clemens et al. (2012). We allow the IMF 
assistance to affect growth not only contemporaneously but with a lag of up to three years, 
and use instrumental variables to remove the potential endogeneity bias. Moreover, we select 
instruments that are of political rather than economic nature – democracy index and 
temporary membership of the UN Security Council – to minimize the possibility that the 
instruments reflect the countries’ economic conditions.  
The results of our analysis add to the recent literature that paints a more positive 
picture than the previous contributions (see Jackson, 2014, and Galiani et al., 2014). We find 
that allowing for IMF assistance to affect growth with a lag is enough to obtain a positive 
impact on growth, even when using only OLS. Moreover, the longer the lag, the greater is the 
size of the positive effect. Accounting for the likely endogeneity of IMF assistance, 
furthermore, increases the size of the estimated effect. With these two methodological 
modifications, we find that receiving IMF assistance increases the annual growth rate of 
recipient countries by between 4 (with a lag of 1 year) and 7 percent (3 years’ lag).  
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Annex 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Min Max Mean Std Dev 
GDP per capita growth rate -50.047 90.470 1.846 6.186 
Investment/GDP  -23.763 113.578 22.294 8.542 
Population Growth -44.408 17.738 1.739 1.671 
IMF Loans 0 1 0.222 0.416 
Democracy -10 10 0.781 7.453 
UNSC 0 1 0.059 0.235 
 
Table 2. OLS Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment 0.1607 0.1614 0.1583 0.1631
(12.75)*** (12.65)*** (12.29)*** (12.58)***
Population Growth -0.5626 -0.569 -0.5821 -0.6007
(-6.07)*** (-6.07)*** (-6.18)*** (-6.35)***
IMF Loans 0.1552 0.6844 0.7056 0.8172
(0.76) (3.30)*** (3.37)*** (3.87)***
R2 0.0591 0.0592 0.0588 0.0599
Lag of IMF Loans 0 1 2 3
Number of countries  183 183 183 183
Number of observations  5498 5410 5321 5231
Method of estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
 
Table 3. 2SLS Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2nd Stage 
Investment 0.1707 0.1624 0.1484 0.1544
(11.72)*** (11.02)*** (9.84)*** (9.95)***
Population Growth -0.5208 -0.4778 -0.3910 -0.3396
(-5.03)** (-4.57) (-3.65) (-2.97)
IMF Loans 3.4548 4.0134 5.7628 6.9738
(1.61) (2.20)*** (3.47)*** (4.29)***
Lag of IMF Loans 0 1 2 3
1st Stage 
Investment -0.00069 0.00078 0.00101 -0.00040
 (.00100) (0.00101) (.00102) (0.00103)
Population Growth 0.01401 0.00353 0.00005 -0.01015
 (.00717)** (0.00727) (0.00731) (0.00736)
UNSC membership -0.0226 -0.01715 -0.00977 -0.00224
 (.02324) (0.02337) (0.02356) (0.02372)
Democracy 0.00944 0.01134 0.01272 0.01345
 (0.00142)*** (0.00143)*** (0.00144)*** (0.00146)***
R2 0.0106 0.0150 0.0191 0.0228
Sargan Statistic (p-value) 0.292 (0.59) 0.284 (0.59) 5.007 (0.02) 0.486 (0.49)
F-statistic 1st stage 11.57 16.10 20.11 23.59
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of countries  104 104 104 104
Number of observations  4484 4388 4290 4190
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. The 
excluded instruments are democracy (Polity IV score) and UN security-council temporary membership.  
